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10
China s Population Policy
in Historical Context
TYRENE WHITE

or nearly forty years, China’s birth limitation program has been the defin
itive example of state intrusion into the realm of reproduction. Although
the notorious one-child policy did not begin officially until 1979, the state’s
claims to a legitimate role in the regulation of childbearing originated in
the 1950S and the enforcement of birth limits in the early 1970s. What was
new about the one-child policy was not the state’s claim of authority over
the realm of human reproduction; that claim had been staked long before.
What was new was the one-child-per-family birth Hmit, and the strength
ened commitment of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders to enforce

F

this limit.
The formal retirement of the one-child birth limit in 2014—the result of a
long-debated decision to allow aU childbearing-age couples to have a second
child if either the mother or father were only children, wiU no doubt invite
many retrospective assessments of its impact on China’s development process,
on women and families, and on Chinese society. Some will emphasize the
hubris of the Chinese government, its audacity in supposing it had the right
to impose strict birth Hmits and make aU adults ask and receive official state
permission to conceive and give birth. Others will look at it from an entirely
different perspective, one that emphasizes the contribution of China to what
they perceive as the problem of global overpopulation. Still others wiU use
economic analysis to determine how much of China’s post-1979 economic
growth can be attributed to the reduced rates of population growth and fertihty that resulted from the policy. A fourth category might emphasize the
gendered dynamics of the Chinese program.’

330

REPRODUCTIVE STATES

Each of these perspectives has its virtues, but one Hmitation will be the
tendency to see the one-child poUcy as a starting point—as the beginning
of China’s great social experiment of the late twentieth century, rather than
the culmination of a political and poUcy process that had been unfolding
in China since 1949, and a global process of social change as the ideas and
instruments of population control evolved and spread during the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries. To understand the meaning and significance of the
one-child poUcy, however, it must be examined against the backdrop of these
global and domestic forces. Domestically, Marxist theory and Soviet practice
combined with China’s post-1949 revolutionary poHtics and Maoist doc
trine to produce a unique language for population policy and carve out a set
of institutions and practices that laid the foundation for strict state regulation
of childbirth. Globally, the debate over the relationship between population
and development, which could be traced to its Malthusian origins, had been
mixed with the ideas of social Darwinism and the institutions of colonial rule
to produce growing anxiety over the rapid growth of the nonwhite popula
tion and the potential threat it posed to the established hierarchy of power
relations and to the quality of the human species.^
These dynamics provided the social and poHtical matrix within which
China’s population policy evolved, and at the broadest level, explain how
China came to embrace the one-child poHcy. In similar fashion, it was the
evolution of these same domestic and global forces that led to its decHne and
retirement.
Before turning to a brief history of the evolution of China’s popula
tion poHcy, a note about the meaning of the so-caUed one-child poHcy. It is
important to keep in mind that “one-child policy” is a useful and descrip
tive label for the birth Hmitation program that China adopted in 1979, but it
does not capture the complexity or variability of the policy as implemented
over time and space and ethnic group. Although all of China’s childbearingage population was urged to have only one child, China’s minority groups
(approximately 10 percent of the population) were never required to Umit
births to one child, nor were many farm households who inhabited rela
tively poor and sparsely populated regions of the country. Parents of children
born with serious physical or mental limitations were also permitted to have
another child. And beginning in 1984, five years after the poUcy’s inception,
rural resistance and widespread reports of female infanticide, combined with
central-level conflict over the direction of reform, led the regime to relax
the pohcy for rural residents whose first child was a girl. Under this revised
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policy, labeled a “one-son or two-child policy,” rural couples whose first
child was female were given official permission to have a second child after
a waiting period of three to five years.There were also periods when Beijing
ceded to local authorities more room to adapt poHcy to local conditions, as
long as they did not exceed their birth and population growth targets for the
year. At other times, however, they exercised more centrahzed control. In
addition, regulations permitted couples comprised of two only children to
have a second child. As large numbers of the one-child generation entered
their marriage and childbearing-age years after 2000, therefore, the numbers
eUgible to have a second child grew rapidly. In short, the “one-child policy”
is a label that accurately describes the poHcy goal, and generally describes the
pohcy in effect for most urban households through 2013, but it obscures the
reahty of a much more complex pattern of regulation and enforcement that
varied over time and space.
Additionally, undue focus on the one-child policy years obscures the
significance of what came before 1979. Yet without the steps taken dur
ing this earlier period, state capacity to Hmit couples to one child would
have been lacking. With that in mind, I will look closely at developments
prior to 1979 that help illuminate the connections between China and the
wider world.

Chinese Politics and Population Policy:
An Overview
The history of China’s population poUcy between 1949 and 1979 echoes
the overall history of the People’s Repubhc over that same period. After the
defeat ofJapan in 1945, the CCP fought a civil war against the US-backed
Nationalist Party. After the Communist victory in 1949, the CCP took sev
eral years to consoUdate its authority and begin the transition to sociaHst
government (i949-52).This was followed by the First Five-Year Plan period
from 1953 to 1957, which saw the collectivization of agriculture and the
sociaUst transformation of the industrial economy. Divisions within the lead
ership over such issues as the pace of collectivization, the role of material
incentives, and the virtues ofmass mobihzation over bureaucratic governance
were temporarily but forcefully reined in by Mao Zedong, who launched the
Great Leap Forward in 1958. This frenzied campaign was grounded in the
Maoist behef in voluntarism, or the capacity of human action, if properly led
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and motivated, to override the limits of the material conditions through mas
sive and sustained human effort.^ In the case of the Great Leap Forward, the
goal was to overtake the Soviet Union in level of development through one
great burst of mobiUzation. Rather than achieve that goal, by 1961 the cam
paign had resulted in around fifty milhon excess deaths due to starvation and
related factors, the near-coUapse of collective agriculmre, and overall eco
nomic stagnation/While other poHtical leaders (including Deng Xiaoping)
worked to restore order and revive the economy from 1962 to 1965, Mao
retreated to focus his attention on the international sociaHst movement.What
he saw happening in the USSR discouraged him, and led him to believe that
it was possible for the revolution to be undermined by “revisionists” who
courted the capitaHst West and preferred negotiation to revolutionary war
fare. Concluding that the Bolshevik Party in Moscow had been corrupted in
this way, he began to build momentum for a great purge of the CCP. Rather
than foUow the standard practice of rectifying the party through an inter
nal process controlled by the party this purge was to be conducted by the
masses, who were encouraged to root out capitaHst-roaders within the party
and purge society of all aspects of traditional or bourgeois culture. As Red
Guards began to foUow Mao’s call in 1966, the Great Proletarian Cultural
Revolution began, and government, poUce, and security operations came to
a halt. Red Guards meted out harsh justice to anyone beHeved to have devi
ated from the Maoist path, and not content with those batdes, they began to
fight among themselves over who should be considered the true followers of
Chairman Mao. When the political devastation and social disruption grew
too severe, Mao chose to rein in the Red Guards, but the poUtical and policy
changes that began during this period (1966—69) continued through 1976.^
Despite the continuation of radical Maoist policies. Premier Zhou Enlai
led a revival of the normal operations of state governance, and the first
order of business was to draft a Fourth Five-Year Plan (1971-75). In 1975,
this was followed by a call for “modernization by the year 2000,” an ambi
tious goal that was intended to prevent China from falling farther behind
its rapidly developing neighbors. Before any significant momentum could
be built toward that goal, however, both Mao and Zhou died in 1976. The
leadership struggle that followed was not resolved until 1978, when Deng
Xiaoping and his aUies relaunched the campaign for “modernization by the
year 2000” and took the first steps toward reform. This new path of reform
allowed China to meet and exceed the development goals it had set for the
year 2000.®
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It was against this backdrop of political volatility that China’s approach to
population poUcy evolved, and like many other poUcies, it became a pawn
in leadership struggles and was subject to changing political winds. During
the first two decades of the Maoist era, however, the proper approach to
demographic issues was hotly debated and contested. Initially, the CCP and
its leader, Mao Zedong, resisted any suggestion that a large population con
stituted a problem. They rejected the claim that China was overpopulated,
arguing instead that the appearance of overpopulation was actually the result
of the exploitative system of capitalism, and would disappear as capitaUsm
was replaced by socialism.
It did not take long, however, for top officials in the CCP to begin to worry
quietly about the pressures created by a large and rapidly growing popula
tion. When the results of China’s first national census were tallied in 1954,
the leadership began to understand the dimensions of the problems China
faced, and some began to worry that the CCP could never meet its promises
to the peasantry to end the hunger and want that had characterized their lives
before the revolution. Some began to speak in more practical ways about
the burden of population growth, and to recommend that China amend its
population poUcy to provide more support for family-planning education
and allow the import of condoms and other contraceptive suppHes.’
Before these first steps could yield any meaningful results, however, the
radicahzation of domestic poHtics interrupted the effort, and advocates of
family planning were branded as “rightists,” or enemies of the revolution. At
the same time, however, the middle and late 1950s was a period of intensified
state planning. All institutions and bureaucracies were mobilized to put into
place annual five-year performance plans that would help China achieve its
goal of becoming an advanced socialist economy and society. In this context,
it was Mao who suggested in 1957 that China should attempt to plan repro
duction in the same way it aspired to plan material production.The focus on
planning made it more difficult for critics to undermine birth control efforts,
since it was the logic of sociaHst planning, and not Malthusian pessimism,
that prompted it. Planning could be associated with either pronataHsm or
antinatahsm.
At the time, birth planning (jihua shengyu), that is, the attempt to regulate
population growth so as to keep it in balance vwth levels of economic pro
duction and growth, was only a goal to be reached at some more advanced
stage of sociaHst development. As China’s population continued to grow rap
idly in the 1960s, however, key leaders such as Premier Zhou Enlai came to
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believe that birth planning could no longer be postponed. In 1965, Zhou
proposed the first national population control target—reducing the annual
rate of population growth to i percent by the end of the century, and by
1972 he had authorized the creation of an extensive family-planning bureau
cracy to oversee implementation of population poUcy, provide free access to
contraceptives, abortions, and steriHzations, and monitor the enforcement
of local birth targets. SociaHst planning thus came to embrace human repro
duction in much the same way that it embraced agricultural and industrial
production. Local officials who were responsible for meeting grain and steel
production quotas now began to receive quotas for babies.*
In the early and mid-1970s, the poHcy focus was “later, longer, fewer,”
that is, promoting later marriage, longer spacing between births (three to
five years), and fewer births (a two-child ideal and a three-child limit). By
mid-decade, the childbearing norm began to tighten; the new slogan was
“One is not too few, two is enough, three is too many.” In the cities, young
couples began to feel pressure to have only one child. In the countryside,
they were urged to have no more than two. In 1979, a group of China’s
top scientists announced that if China was to achieve its economic goals
by the year 2000—a goal that the new Deng regime had expressed as
achieving a per capita gross national product of $1,000 by the year 2000
(subsequently reduced to $800 per capita),population had to be contained
within 1.2 billion. In turn, this meant that the official birth limit had to
be lowered to one child per couple (with some exceptions for special
circumstances). The scientists, whose computer models and calculations
were based on faulty and inadequate data, succeeded in persuading Deng
Xiaoping of the absolute necessity of the one-child policy, and it soon
became official policy.®
In an extraordinary “Open Letter” to CCP members that was pub
lished in all newspapers in September 1980, China’s leaders defended the
new policy and made it clear to the CCP membership the high level of
priority they attached to it. They argued that the two-decade delay after
1949 was a fateful mistake. By the time the state began to encourage fer
tility control, a huge new generation of young people had already been
born who were approaching their childbearing years. As a result, even
with declining fertility levels (i.e., the average number of children born
to a woman during her reproductive years), demographic momentum
meant continued growth of total population size.That growth threatened
to reach 1.5 billion by century’s end if no action was taken, the letter
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argued, a number that would doom China to poverty and backward
ness through another generation if urgent action was not taken by this
generation.

Implementing the One-Child Policy
The one-child poUcy was inaugurated just as the Deng regime was about
to embark on a far-reaching reform program that gradually transformed
China’s economy, poUty, and society. The collective economy was gradually
decollectivized and marketized; poHtics was deradicalized and poHtical insti
tutions revived; society was granted relief from the aU-intrusive party-state
that had permeated every aspect of pubUc and private life. Change came in
fits and stops, with periods of dramatic change often followed by a partial
retreat to safer political ground.This pattern gave Chinese politics a cyclic or
wave pattern, not unlike the high tides and low tides of the mass campaigns of
the Mao era.Through all of these changes and fluctuations in pofitical atmo
sphere, the insistence on strict birth control never faltered. It was a constant
in an otherwise volatile situation.
In the early years of the program (1979-83), as the Deng regime fought
against the lingering influences of the Cultural Revolution, it was possible to
use the tools and institutions of the Maoist era to press for strict enforcement
of birth quotas that were handed down to each city, county, neighborhood,
and village. Thirty years of Maoism had taught Chinese citizens to be wary
of voicing opposition to the latest campaign, taught officials that they could
intimidate and coerce anyone who dared to defy them, and taught party
leaders at all levels that the failure to meet campaign quotas was one of the
seven deadly sins of Chinese poHtics. A poor campaign performance could
spell the end of a promising career.
The tasks local officials faced were formidable. AH childbearing-age
couples, urban and rural, had to receive official birth permits from the state
in order to give birth legaUy. In addition, provinces and local governments
drafted regulations offering economic incentives to encourage policy compHance and imposing stiff sanctions on poHcy violators. AH childbearing-age
women were required to undergo periodic gynecological exams to ensure
they were not carrying an “unplanned” pregnancy, and if they were, they
were pressed to undergo an abortion immediately.The new regulations often
came with a three-month window before enforcement began; women who
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were already pregnant, but did not have an official birth permit, were thus
duly warned, and faced the difficult choice between abortion or family ruin. “
In China s cities and towns, the total fertility rate had dechned from 3.3 in
1970 to about 1.5 by 1978, a remarkably low level for a developing country.
Determined to push it even lower, however, state monitoring intensified in
workplaces and neighborhoods. Monthly or quarterly gynecological exami
nations for chUdbearing-age women, plus a system of marriage and birth
permits provided by the collective work unit or the neighborhood commit
tee, made it hard for anyone to escape the tight surveillance net. Those who
did faced severe penalties if caught, including fines and loss of employment,
perhaps even one’s coveted urban household registration.'^
Rural China posed a far greater challenge. Agricultural work requires
household labor, and even very young children can be put to work in ser
vice of the family income. Moreover, children were the only guarantee
of old-age support, and the most destitute villagers were inevitably those
who were alone and childless. Only a son could assure a couple that they
would be spared such a fate. Daughters usually married out of the village,
and upon marriage a daughter’s first obHgation transferred to her husband’s
family. In addition to these practical considerations, the traditional emphasis
on bearing sons to carry on the ancestral line remained deeply entrenched
in the countryside. As a result, although rural fertihty levels were cut in half
between 1971 and 1979 (declining from approximately 6.0 to 3.0), much of
rural China remained hostile to a two- or one-child hmit, including the vil
lage officials who would have to enforce the policy. When the rural reforms
implemented after 1978 began to relax the state’s administrative grip on the
peasantry just as the one-child pohcy was launched, therefore, it set the stage
for an intense struggle over the control of childbearing.
The struggle took a variety of forms. In some villages, women who refused
to abort an unplanned birth were subjected to endless meetings where they
were berated, intimidated, and threatened into cooperation. In others, medi
cal teams and party cadres swooped in unexpectedly, in an effort to catch
women who were eluding them. At worst, women were forced onto trucks
and taken directly to the township headquarters, where medical personnel
would perform abortions and sterilizations and insert intrauterine devices.
The use of some form of birth control after the first or second child became
mandatory, and in the countryside the preferred method was the lUD, since
it was always in place and not easily removed.The insertion of an lUD imme
diately after childbirth became standard practice.
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Villagers resisted in a variety of ways, including leaving the village until the
campaign was over and the baby was born, using bribery to get a birth per
mit, attacking or killing family-planning officials, resorting to female infan
ticide, or, more common after the mid-1980s, sex-selective abortion. Absent
the one-child poUcy, it was common in the countryside to consider the birth
of a daughter a “small happiness” and a son a “big happiness.” When this pat
tern of son preference was reinforced by a one-child birth Umit, some were
driven to use any means possible to guarantee they would have a son.''^
Rather than retreat in the face of resistance, the state intensified its efforts.
In late 1982, a massive sterUization campaign was launched, with the goal of
eUminating all third and higher births. The result of this massive campaign
was a fourfold increase in the number of tubal Ugations performed in 1983,
as compared with the previous years, and large increases across every cat
egory of birth control procedures. So severe were the local pressures to meet
sterilization targets that many women who had long since completed their
intended childbearing, and had been effectively utilizing some form of birth
control, were forced to undergo sterihzation.'^
As the campaign began to play itself out and elite politics took a more
“hberal” turn, inplementation moved into a second phase (1984-89). A deci
sion was made to modify the one-cluld policy to allow for more exceptions.
Fearful of a breakdown of authority in the countryside and widespread anger
over the one-child limit and the often brutal tactics used to enforce it, leaders
in Beijing decided to simply concede the need for a son in the countryside.
Henceforth, the rural pohcy became a one-son or two-child policy.'® Village
couples whose first child was a daughter would be allowed to have a second
child, allowed to try again for a son.This concession was made in the hopes of
pacifying restless villagers, improving enforcement, and reducing the upsurge
in female infanticide and female infant abandonment, but over a period of
several years, the net effect of this and other rural reforms was to encourage
local governments to unduly relax their enforcement efforts.ViUage officials
who themselves were subject to the birth control poUcies often colluded
with their neighbors to avoid enforcement efforts undertaken by outside
teams. As the agricultural reforms destroyed the instruments of control and
power that officials had enjoyed in the past, they found it difficult to enforce
birth Hmits, and found it easier to report false numbers than fight with neigh
bors and kin.”
The net effect of this poHcy “slippage” was to weaken central control over
the levers ofenforcement, and provide support for experts and birth-planning
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officials who argued that the policy should be more flexible across differ
ent regions of China, allowing those in the most impoverished areas with
difficult, hilly terrain to have two children, allowing those in average cir
cumstances to have one son or two children, and Umiting those in more
prosperous areas to only one child. They believed that the same results could
be achieved, with less effort and more willing compUance, than if the poUcy
did not respond to the nuances of family need and economic circumstance.
This more differentiated pohcy was put into place in the latter half of
the 1980s, only to be upset by the events of May—June 1989, which ended
in a miUtary crackdown on Tiananmen protesters and their supporters in
Beijing and around the country. The martial atmosphere that returned to
Chinese politics for the next two to three years made it possible to once again
tighten local enforcement, ushering in a third phase of poUcy enforcement
(1989-95). As in 1982-83,fears about a poor performance justified the revival
of campaign methods. Cadres who had been warned off those methods in the
mid-1980s were now instructed to use “crack troops” and “shock attacks” to
break through resistance and meet the new goals of the I99i~95 pl^ri period.
They were also chastised over the failure to meet the goals of the five-year
plan ending in 1990. China s population control targets for that year had been
exceeded by a very substantial margin, giving fuel to those who believed that
it was acceptable to use coercion in service of the higher goal of achieving
the per capita economic goals that had been set for the year 2000. It was also
justified by the preliminary results of the 1990 census, which indicated that
China’s population had grown more quickly than planned or expected.”*
These numbers prompted the conservative leadership to tighten enforce
ment, returning to a strict formula that Umited all urban couples to only
one child, and aU rural couples to one son or two children. Exceptions were
granted only to some of China’s smaller minority nationahties, and to parents
whose first child was mentally or physically handicapped to such a degree
that they were unable to function as a healthy, working adult. Local officials
were put on notice that they were Hable for strict enforcement, and that
failure to achieve their performance targets for birth planning would result
in economic penalties, administrative sanctions, and even demotions. They
were to assume that meeting population targets was just as important to their
future career success as meeting key economic goals.'®
This success came at a price, however. Evidence of intimidation and coer
cion was widespread, particularly in areas that had done poorly prior to 1990.
Rural cadres who sided with their fellow villagers did what was necessary
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to give the appearance of compliance, but also behaved as they had in the
past when the work was hard and the campaign targets too ambitious—^by
lying, exaggerating, or finding other ways to manipulate the system. Because
of these practices and others, many Chinese demographers expressed great
skepticism when survey data suggested in 1995 that China’s fertihty level had
dropped to 1.4.“
The reversion to a more radical political atmosphere began to fade after sev
eral years, ushering in yet another phase of policy evolution and implementa
tion (1995-2013). Responding to the new challenges, the post-Tiananmen
politics of conservatism gave way to a new wave of reform and opening that
rapidly transformed the political, economic, and social landscape.
It was in this context that many of China’s population specialists began
again to challenge the wisdom of the administrative and punitive approach
to population control that had been reUed on since the 1970s. Leading figures
in China’s new generation of highly trained demographers and sociologists
criticized the assumption that “fewer births is everything,” arguing that it
led to “short-sighted actions (such as surprise raids on big-bellied women).”
Frankly acknowledging that China’s fertihty decHne had been induced
through the widespread use of coercion, the authors insisted on the need for
a broader and more complex view of population dynamics and a popula
tion pohcy better suited to an overall strategy of “sustainable development.”
Writing that “the curtain is gradually closing on the era of monolithic popu
lation control,” the authors went on to discuss the disturbing consequences of
that approach (including sex ratio imbalances and a rapidly aging population)
and the necessity of shifting to a developmental approach that emphasized
improvements and investments in the quaUty of the population.^' In short,
they argued that development was the best route to fertility decline, rejecting
in the process the sort of “population determinism” (fewer births is every
thing) that was so deeply embedded in China’s population control strategy.
Domestically, the problem of rural unrest and instability was again preoc
cupying the leadership, and buttressed the position of advocates of reform.
One of the major complaints ofvillagers was the use of coercive birth control
tactics to collect taxes and fees owed to the local government. Not only did
new documents on rural taxation expHcidy forbid the use of those mea
sures, a family-planning document issued in 1995 codified them as seven
types of prohibited behaviors: (i) illegally detaining, beating, or humiliating
an offender or a relative; (2) destroying property, crops, or houses; (3) rais
ing mortgages without legal authorization; (4) imposing “unreasonable”
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fines or confiscating goods; (5) implicating relatives or neighbors of offend
ers, or retahating against those who report cadre misbehavior; (6) prohibiting
childbirths permitted by the local plan in order to fulfill population targets;
(7) organizing pregnancy checkups for unmarried women.This itemiza
tion of unacceptable behaviors underscored the extent to which the increas
ingly professional family-planning bureaucracy sought to distance itself from
the coercive methods of enforcement that had remained prevalent in the
countryside.
Meanwhile, changes in the international discourse on population and
development also encouraged advocates of poHcy reform. When China
began to implement its one-child policy in 1979, the discourse on popula
tion issues was still dominated by a “population control” paradigm that saw
population growth as an impediment to national advancement and a threat
to global survival. By the mid-1990s, another school of thought had emerged
and displaced the old paradigm.This alternative approach focused on wom
en’s reproductive health and rights, and emphasized the organic relationship
between the elevation of the status of women (especially through increased
education and employment outside the home), the elimination of poverty,
and declining fertility levels.
Convinced that change was already overdue, many demographers and
family-planning officials embraced this new discourse, and called for
the reform of China’s poHcy. Change came slowly, however, despite the
unsavory consequences of the policy, including a distorted sex ratio and a
rapidly aging population. After some internal debate, the Chinese govern
ment officially reavowed its one-child policy in 2000 and in 2001 passed
a long-debated Population and Family Planning Law that upheld the
existing policy and gave compliance the force of law.Although the law
included provisions that called for an “informed choice of safe, effective,
and appropriate contraceptive methods,” and one prohibiting officials from
infringing on “personal rights, property rights, or other legitimate rights
and interests,” it reaffirmed China’s basic approach to population control.
Subsequently, however, as the one-child generation matured and married
in growing numbers, the state reiterated the right of two single children to
have a second child if desired.
Despite the political reluctance to abandon the one-cluld poHcy, poUcy
developments in other areas began to shift the focus away from raw popu
lation numbers. The decade was dominated by growing concerns over the
lack of a social insurance system and retirement support for an aging society.
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rapidly rising healthcare costs associated with both aging and environmen
tal degradation, and sustainabiUty and climate change. Taken together, these
issues formed a development trifecta that revealed the need for a more flex
ible and supple population poUcy. As a result, pressures for reform grew. By
2012, those pressures led to the pubhcation of a pro-reform report by the
China Development Research Foundation, a top-tier think tank that is sup
ported by, and advises, the State Council on poHcy issues.The report, which
urged that the one-child policy be phased out by 2015, paved the way for
decisions announced subsequently during the Eighteenth Party Congress
and National People’s Congress in 2013.

China’s Population Control Program
in Global Perspective
In 1989, when the Deng regime crushed the prodemocracy movement,
China still inhabited a world defined by the contours of the Cold War. By
1992, that world had disappeared, and the CCP now faced the problem of
how to survive in a post-Leninist, postsociahst world. The answer, in part,
was to hft the conservative strictures that had been imposed afterJune 4,1989,
and return to the path of economic reform. As was the case in 1979, however,
strictures on childbearing remained firmly in place. Justifications of the onechild policy in 1980 were based on the argument that sociafist moderniza
tion could not be achieved without it, and the CCP was obUged to take all
steps necessary to achieve that goal. By 1995, with the end of the Cold War
and collapse of the Soviet Union, the language of socialism was more muted.
Modernization was everything, and even as China’s economy steamed
toward levels of economic development that had only been dreamed of in
1979, the leadership refused to revisit the one-child pohcy in any serious way.
Annual reports and speeches attributed China’s great economic success to
correct economic poUcies and directives. Population control, which in 1980
was argued to be the crucial factor on which all development goals rested,
was given Uttle credit by the late 1990s. And yet the “numbers are every
thing” approach, long abandoned in other parts of the economy, remained
the rigid foundation on which China’s population pohcy was premised.
China’s move in 1979 to Hmit childbearing-age couples to only one
child was a unique and unprecedented state intervention into the realm
of reproduction, a confirmation, if you will, of Michel Foucault’s vision of
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all-encompassing state hegemony.^* Taking that step took audacity, author
ity, institutional capacity, and a degree of leadership commitment that is rare
in any regime. If there were distinctive quahties of the Chinese context that
made the conception and enforcement of a one-child policy possible, how
ever, there were also other ways in which Chinese experience ran parallel to
that of many other developing world countries, especially in Asia. For all of
its unique elements, the Chinese case was also part of a broader global history
and was significantly influenced by it.
Turning first to the distinctive aspects of the Chinese experience, China
succeeded in intensifying its population control policy and reducing the birth
hmit to one child by relying on a number of unique ideas and institutions,
and by wedding population control to the regime’s highest priority of all—
rapid modernization.The idea ofjihm shengyu or “birth planning,’’ a concept
central to the Chinese program, allowed advocates of birth control to elide
the internal struggle between leftist and rightist forces, a development that
helped to insulate the government’s increasingly bold antinataHst stance from
the radical poHtics and policies of the Cultural Revolution decade (196676). This development was crucial, allowing advocates of birth control and
regulated childbirth to block charges from the left of neo-Malthusianism,
and charges from cultural conservatives within the party who objected to
the expansion of family-planning education and access on moral grounds.
In the early attempts to advocate family planning, supporters had used the
hberal language of the West, translating “family planning’’ literally as jiating
jihua, population control as renkou jiezhi, and birth control as shengyu jiezhi.
The shift to jihua shengyu, or birth planning, was purposeful, placing the entire
project within the poUticaUy unassailable context of socialist economic plan
ning. From the time of the second birth control campaign in the mid-1960s,
therefore, birth planning defined China’s poUcy, and jiating shengyu (family
planning) was used only to distinguish China’s approach from the liberal,
bourgeois model of the West.
In addition to this unique language, China benefited from unique institu
tions. The CCP was the key institution, since it penetrated all levels and all
organizations of Chinese society. Its pervasive presence in every town and
village, and the regime’s insistence after the revolution that there be no inde
pendent sources of influence or authority, meant that leaders in Beijing had a
rehable instrument of enforcement. Whatever the limitations and weaknesses
in Beijing’s ability to compel a disciplined response from party officials down
the line—and there were many—those limitations paled in comparison
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with the challenges faced by other developing world regimes. Although the
reform era made it increasingly difficult to maintain that discipUne, Beijing
adapted as necessary. In the early 1990s, for example, lax enforcement of birth
limits led Beijing to introduce the “one-ballot veto system” for assessing the
work of local officials. This system was intended to make birth control tar
gets as important as economic targets by making their achievement critical
to annual assessments of cadre performance. Under this system, fulfilling or
even exceeding all economic targets was insufficient to gain a positive assess
ment and receive bonuses and other perks. Cadres also had to meet their
birth control goals. If not, this one failure would taint their evaluation, and
perhaps their career.
A second unique institution that Beijing could draw on was the mobi
lization campaign, which embodied a Maoist approach to policy imple
mentation. Mass mobilization campaigns were an endemic part of the
political and policy process in China, and were used extensively to gal
vanize the party to swift action, mobilize the masses to participate in
the campaign, and push toward the fulfillment of the campaign’s goals.
During the Maoist era, these campaigns followed a predictable pattern.
First came the caU to mobilize, then came the campaign to carry out the
program, which led to frenzied efforts on the part of local authorities that
often provoked a backlash and resistance from the targets of the campaign.
This reaction to the overreach by local enforcers led to a moderation of
the program, which sometimes was followed by a second hard push for
enforcement. Party officials at all levels were highly motivated to meet the
targets or goals they had been assigned, since failure to do so could result
in a major career setback or, even worse, a political attack on officials’ revo
lutionary commitment.^*
Frequent repetitions of this pattern during the Maoist era had the effect of
turning it into China’s primary institution for policy implementation, and it
was this instrument that the new Deng regime turned to when it launched
the one-chQd policy. And here we stumble upon a great historical irony. At
the very moment when the Deng regime was setting out to undo much of the
Maoist legacy, Hberate Chinese politics and society from the disruptive con
sequences of repeated poUtical campaigns, and routinize Chinese governance,
the new leaders put their full weight behind a massive campaign to implement
the one-child poHcy and turned a bfind eye to the waves of coercion that
swept through many parts of China over the next few years as local officials
were pressed to meet exacting and difficult population targets.

344

REPRODUCTIVE STATES

Although the one-child policy and campaign w'as launched in 1979, it was
the “Open Letter” to all CCP members, pubhshed in the flagship newspaper
on September 20, 1980, that stands as the most potent marker of the cam
paign, and once again sets China apart. Not only did China’s leaders expect
party members to carry out the campaign, they expected them to abide by
it. Younger party members were called on to take the lead in signing a cer
tificate pledging to have only one child, and undergoing sterilization after
the birth of their first child. Older party members in positions of leadership
were urged to support their cluldbearing-age children in taking the onechild pledge. By making this call public, party leaders brought pressure to
bear on reluctant local-level officials who shared the view of their neighbors
that one child was not enough, and that faiHng to produce a son to carry
on the ancestral Une would bring a worse fate than defying the one-child
Umit. Ultimately, many did defy that Hmit by using influence, bribes, or falsely
acquired medical certificates to get around it. Comparatively speaking, how
ever, what is remarkable is the extent to which the CCP organization was
able to discipHne its members at all levels.The unprecedented “Open Letter”
was a clear signal to aU local officials that the one-child poHcy was a top pri
ority of the PoUtburo, and had to be treated as such.
Another set of institutions assured a high level of compliance among
the urban population. In the early years of reform, China’s system of col
lectivized work units remained in place, allowing for close supervision
of childbearing-age couples. While compliance with the one-child limit
brought tangible benefits such as free healthcare and priority status for
school admissions, failure to comply could mean being fired, denied hous
ing, and denied access to the many other collective benefits that came
with being part of a work unit. Rather than risk these consequences, most
acquiesced in the program, which for childbearing-age women meant
subjection to gynecological exams monthly or quarterly to be sure they
had not become pregnant without the necessary state-issued birth permit.
This step was only one of many ways in which women’s bodies became
the site for policy implementation. The massive 1983—84 sterilization
campaign, for example, forced many compliant women to abandon the
birth control method they had been using reliably and undergo steriliza
tion instead. They were pressured to do so by local officials who had to
meet their quotas and targets for sterilization procedures within a certain
period of time, and could not do so without sterilizing women who were
no risk to the birth limits.^®
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Rural institutions were disrupted by the new reforms more quickly than
urban ones, placing rural oiFicials in a more precarious position in attempting
to carry out birth control work. With their monopoly of economic power
beginning to dissolve and with their own desire to have more than one child,
rural officials were often caught in a difficult position that only a campaign
launched from higher levels could alleviate. As a result, poorly performing
counties or districts were often called upon to launch a localized campaign,
assisted by medical personnel drafted from county hospitals to speed the rate
at which birth control procedures—abortions, lUD insertions, sterilizations,
and vasectomies—could be carried out. Large numbers of personnel would
descend on a particular locality with the goal of ending aU “unplanned”
pregnancies (that is, pregnancies that were not authorized by the requisite
state-issued birth permit) and sterifizing those who had already violated the
one-child birth Hmit. If resistance was encountered, as it often was, officials
used whatever means necessary to coerce compliance. Popular methods
included destroying new homes or other personal property of farmers, hold
ing one or more of the offender’s parents or grandparents in custody until
they relented, or subjecting the pregnant women to isolation and harangue
until they gave in. All of these methods were officially outlawed in the
mid-1990s, but they were used extensively before that time and continued to
be used more sporadically over the next twenty years.The campaigns became
routinized to coincide with Spring Festival (Chinese NewYear), when famiHes gathered, marriages occurred, and spouses Hving in different places were
reunited, or the summer harvest (August or September), when farmers got a
respite from their ongoing labor. 3°
It is important to note that the effectiveness of the campaign approach
was progressively eroded by the success of China’s economic reforms,
which brought economic development, social change, and a shift to more
routine forms of bureaucratic governance. These changes led to increased
reliance on legal and administrative measures and a decline in tolerance
for the more blunt and coercive tactics associated with campaign-style
enforcement. This shift did not prevent, however, the episodic recurrence
of campaigns in scattered localities by local officials determined to make
quick progress on lowering fertility levels.Those enforcement practices, in
turn, fomented the popular anger that became more pronounced over time.
If the institutions and practices described above were distinctive to China,
in other respects the Chinese program, its motives, and its evolution were
the product of the same global forces that influenced demographic policies
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elsewhere.Whether responding to, or reacting against, international influ
ences, China’s policy has been shaped far more by external sources than is
generally acknowledged.
The influence of international forces on the evolution of China’s popu
lation policy can be seen in several ways. First is the influence of the early
twentieth-century Euro-American movements supporting birth control
and eugenics .^^^hile the Chinese revolution unfolded in the early and mid
twentieth century, anxieties among Western elites about the growth and
quality of global population—anxieties fueled by Malthusian and social
Darwinian ideas—helped to galvanize the international family-planning
movement and shape their views of China. Margaret Sanger, who sat at
the intersection of the family-planning and eugenics movements, traveled
to China,Japan, and Korea in 1922 to lecture on the subjects and received
an enthusiastic reception from local supporters, who began to organize a
local birth control league.^" Many Chinese feminists and supporters of the
New Culture Movement supported her call for birth control, and female
physicians began to open clinics devoted to the needs of women and chil
dren, including birth control education and services. Due to the politi
cal turbulence of the 1920s and 1930s, however, these developments were
limited in their scope and impact, and nationalist elites proffered a range
of views.
The Chinese Communist Party, by contrast, took a more unified view of
the matter, dismissing Umited measures such as access to birth control as bour
geois and calling for sociahst revolution to truly Hberate Chinese women.
Their official party poHcy in the 1930s and 1940s was pronatalist; high birth
rates among the peasantry were seen as the only means to compensate for
losses due to war, disease, and high infant mortahty. At the same time, the
demand for access to birth control by urban women joining the revolution
led to an official pohcy advocating delaying marriage until the end of the war
with Japan. For married couples, birth control was sanctioned as a means to
delay childbirth.^^
This policy did not go unchallenged, however. Opponents writing
in the newspaper Liberation Daily (Jiefang ribao) argued that birth control
surgery was dangerous and bad for women s health. Others opposed birth
control on moral grounds, arguing that giving birth was a natural human
phenomenon that should not be artificially regulsted.^'* In the face of this
opposition, restrictions were placed on access to abortion and sterihzation,
but birth control after marriage was officially sanctioned.
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At liberation, this birth control policy remained in force, despite the
adoption of a pronatalist line. With the party leadership absorbed with
more pressing issues, decision-making on birth control devolved to the
newly created Ministry of Public Health. Dominated by Western-trained
medical professionals who were inclined by tradition and training to be
conservative on the issue of contraception, the ministry drew up regula
tions that imposed severe restrictions on access to contraception, abortion,
and sterilization. In April 1950, regulations were issued governing access
to abortion by female cadres in party, government, and military posts in
the Beijing District.The regulations were designed to severely limit access,
and those who met the strict conditions were required to obtain a series
of written approvals before the procedure could take place.’^ By May 1952,
national regulations had been drafted; they were approved at the end of the
year and disseminated on a trial basis.^* The regulations outlawed sterihzation or abortion except in cases of severe illness or threat to the woman. In
addition, no woman was eUgible for steriHzation unless she was thirty-five
years old, had six or more children, and had one child aged ten or above.’^
Reinforcing this strict Hne, the Ministry of Health also moved to Hmit
access to contraceptives. In January 1953, only days after the regulations were
approved, the ministry notified customs officials that they should stop the
import of contraceptives.This ban, combined with the restrictive policy
that discouraged the production of contraceptives domestically, meant that
even the rudimentary and unreHable contraceptive supphes available at that
time would continue to be extremely scarce. Supporters of family planning
thus faced formidable opposition, and that argument unfolded in the mid1950s in the form of the rise and quick fall of China’s first family-planning
campaign. Access to contraceptives and education on family planning, then,
were no less contested in revolutionary China than they were in the West,
and despite the sociaHst doctrine that framed the debate, the issues were pre
cisely the same.
A second external influence on the CCP’s early position on population
and family planning was the emerging Cold War. In 1949, the US govern
ment, seeking to explain the defeat of its aUies, the Nationalists, despite mas
sive aid and military support, prepared an extensive official history of US
poHcy in China, explaining why it had ultimately withdrawn support from
the Nationahsts, why the CCP was winning, but also why the Communist
regime was bound to fail. The analysis argued that the CCP would not be
able to meet its obhgation to feed its population because of the unchecked
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population growth. In other words, it argued that the Malthusian dilemma
would defeat them.^^ Mao Zedong’s response was to condemn this “pessi
mistic view’’ emanating from the capitalist West as reactionary, Malthusian,
and “utterly groundless,’’ and to insist instead that China’s large population
was a great asset.‘^° This rejection of what he saw as Malthusian logic was
justified by Marxist ideology, which saw “overpopulation” as a byproduct of
capitalism that would be eliminated by the revolution. It was also consistent
with the party’s pre-1949 pronatalist pohcy, as well as the Soviet Union’s pronatahst policy after World War II. Nevertheless, this exchange of verbal hostihties elevated an ongoing and complex internal process of sorting out party
pohcy on population issues to the status of international insult, creating even
greater resistance within the CCP to family planning.
A third external factor that influenced China was the successful imple
mentation of family-planning and birth control programs in its neighbor
ing countries. In the 1950s and 1960s, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan all
developed birth control programs, and in the case ofJapan, it was also very
apparent by the mid-1960s that the Japanese economy was recovering rap
idly from its destruction in World War II. Chinese premier Zhou Enlai was
especially taken with these developments, particularly given the toll of the
Great Leap Forward on China’s economy. Between 1963 and 1966, Zhou
spoke frequently and forcefully on the issue of birth control, arguing that
it was a “shortcoming” (duanchu) of the socialist system that it did not have
a “population plan.” Zhou explained this by noting that neither Marx nor
Lenin had confronted the problem; their writings therefore offered no guid
ance or solutions. Foreshadowing later developments, he also remarked: “In
my opinion, after having two children, it is best to undergo sterilization.”'*'
In July 1963, in a speech to high school graduates, Zhou defended the birth
control pohcy against charges that it was Malthusian. Noting that Malthus
relied on war and pestilence to solve the population problem, Zhou said.
We can’t rely on war to solve the population problem, and we can’t rely on pes
tilence, and we certainly can’t rely on overseas developments----[Instead] we
must study advanced experience.'*''
He went on to use the example ofJapan as a country whose achievements
in reducing birth rates deserved China’s attention. He advocated send
ing experts to Japan to study their methods, or inviting Japanese experts
to China. Zhou apparently was struck by the fact that Japan’s population
growth rate had dropped to about 10 per 1,000 by the mid-1960s, so much
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so that in the fall of 1965 he urged in several speeches that China strive to
achieve the same low growth rate by the end of the century.^ His repeated
references to the Japanese example are remarkable given the recent history
ofjapan’s invasion and occupation of China between 1937 ^tid I945> ^tid it is
indicative of the urgency Zhou felt about China s rapid population growth.
Unfortunately, the radical poUtics of the Cultural Revolution prevented any
further action, but as soon as the most radical phase was over, Zhou began to
restore normal government work, develop a new five-year plan, and press for
a bigger investment in birth control.
Yet a fourth influence on China was the evolving global discourse on pop
ulation control.Whereas an international conference held in 1964 was domi
nated by those who voiced unbridled enthusiasm for population control,
the 1974 UN conference on population and development, held in Budapest,
was divided between a pro-population control coaHtion of mostly developed
world states, and delegations from the global South who took a neo-Marxist
view that saw population and poverty as a by-product of long-standing
exploitation by the capitaHst North. To redress this inequity, they called for
debt forgiveness and economic restructuring to bring about a redistribution
of wealth.'*^ China, which had long positioned itself in foreign affairs as an
advocate of nonaUgned Third World regimes, publicly supported this view,
while continuing to push aggressively at home to lower fertility rates.*^*
When the reform era began a few years later and China’s commitment to
population control became more transparent, the UN Fund for Population
Activities, along with many NGOs, academic centers, and scholars, provided
enthusiastic support to Chinese authorities who were anxious to improve
their facilities and expertise on demographic issues.They helped train a new
cohort of Chinese demographers and offered technical assistance as China
prepared to carry out a population census in 1982. Since that time, China has
participated in a vast number of international meetings and conferences, col
laborated with UN organizations and NGOs on research and applied proj
ects, and become an important source of expertise to countries who wish to
draw on China’s impressive demographic resources and experience.
The profoundly important role ofinternational actors and ideas on China’s
program is best illustrated by two examples.The first is the role of Song Jian,
a prominent scientist, in leading China toward a one-child policy. Attending
his first international conference in Sweden in 1978) Song became inter
ested in the scientific modeUng techniques that had been used to develop the
Club of Rome report called The Limits to Growth in 1972, and Mankind at the
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Turning Point in 1974.'^'’Though his expertise was in cybernetics, and though
the techniques and the predictions they produced had been widely criticized
and dismissed in the West, he returned to China and used similar modeHng
techniques to convince Deng Xiaoping that China s only hope for modern
ization was with a one-child birth Hmit/^
The second example comes in the 1990s, when internal criticism of
China’s one-child policy and its consequences began spiUing out into aca
demic journals and professional conferences. This criticism was provoked in
part by the new campaign that had gotten underway in the early 1990s to
crack down on violators of the birth limit, giving rise to a new round of coer
cion in many areas of the countryside. It was also provoked by the now very
wide divide that existed between the highly professionaHzed scholars and
bureaucrats who advised and manned the top ranks of the family-planning
bureaucracy, and the old guard poHtical leadership that resisted all calls for
policy reform. In this context, two high-profile international conferences
gave support and momentum to the reformers.
The first was the 1994 UN Conference on Population and Development
that was held in Cairo, and the second was the UN Conference on Women
that was held in Beijing in 1995. For many feminists, the Cairo conference
was the culmination of a decade or more of work to shift the discourse
on population and development from one focused on reducing population
numbers to one focused on reproductive rights and women’s status. Despite
continued differences among representatives over language pertaining to
abortion, in particular, the conference report embraced the new language
and emphasized the organic relationship between the elevation of the status
of women (especially through increased education and employment outside
the home), the elimination of poverty, and decUning fertiUty levels."**
The substance of the conference was reported in some detail in the
Chinese media and in population journals, and shortly thereafter, the influ
ence of the new international language on Chinese policy became clear. In
China’s “Outhne Plan for Family PlanningWork in 1995-2000,” for example,
stress was placed on the impact of the sociaHst market economy on popu
lation control, and on the necessity of Hnking population control to eco
nomic development. In addition, the plan placed special emphasis on the role
of education, and urged aggressive efforts to increase women’s educational
level in order to promote lower fertility. This emphasis dovetailed with the
Millennial Development Goals adopted by most UN member states in 2000,
specifying a set of goals to be reached by 2015. China took an active role in
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supporting this agenda, which included a focus on women’s empowerment
and education, along with gender equaHty/*
A second UN conference, the UN’s Fourth World Conference on
Women, held in Beijing in 1995, strongly reinforced the Cairo message,
provoking a new wave of feminist thinking and action, and further encour
aging SFPC officials to consider a more client-centered approach that gave
greater consideration to women’s needs and their reproductive health.
This conference was also important in stimulating the growth of nongov
ernmental organizations in China, with greater focus on issues related to
women and gender, and it encouraged established organizations like the
Women’s Federation to become stronger advocates for women.
Still another way in which global forces influenced the evolution of
China’s population policy was the revolution in telecommunications that
made it increasingly difficult to deflect and bury reports that contradicted
claims that birth Hmits were enforced by routine administrative means, and
not through the use of coercion. During the 1980s and 1990s, Chinese citi
zens with complaints against local officials often turned to domestic or for
eign journalists when their complaints fell on deaf government ears. By the
later 1990s, however, the arrival of social media platforms, along with a more
prosperous and tech-sawy population that had easy access to them, made
containment impossible. In 2012, for example, the family of a woman who
was forced to abort her seven-month old fetus used social media to publi
cize her story. Supported by gruesome photographs of the aborted fetus, the
story drew enormous attention and public outcry, revealing through posted
comments the depth and breadth of the hatred of the one-child poHcy and
the hostility toward those who enforce it.*' Repeated episodes of this sort
were an embarrassment to a regime moving to the forefront of global affairs,
and the pubUc hostility they revealed tapped into anxieties about regime sta
bility. Taking incremental steps toward retiring the policy was a way to deal
with those concerns and dampen popular resentment.*^
Ultimately, of course, the decision to retire the one-child policy was
an economic and social one. With a rapidly aging population, the policy
no longer paid the substantial economic dividends that it had in previous
decades. On the contrary, it was setting China up for economic difficul
ties in the future. Socially, the pressure to abandon the policy was rising,
especially as those born under the one-child poHcy were now eligible to
have two children if both parents were only children. Skewed sex ratios,
recognized as one of the worst social consequences of the one-child limit.
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remained a major problem, one that would constrain marriage options of
millions of young men for decades to come. Just as important, corruption
and wealth had allowed many to buy their way to a second, or even third
child, by simply paying the required fines. In a social climate where there
was great resentment of official corruption and economic inequaHty, retain
ing a policy that was being enforced so unevenly was an increasingly dan
gerous proposition.

Consequences and Legacy of China’s
One-Child PoUcy
The one-child pohcy was adopted just as the reform era began in 1979.This
poses two problems for assessing its impact. First, the consequences of the
one-child program are deeply intertwined with the consequences and results
of economic and political reform, so much so that it can be difficult to distin
guish the effects of birth planning from other effects of reform. And where
those effects are clearly entangled, it is even harder to weigh the relative influ
ence of one versus the other. Second, looking at the consequences of the
one-child policy from today’s vantage point, it is easy to forget that the con
sequences have been unfolding and evolving since 1979.They are not static
or categorical. This fluidity means that there can be no definitive assessment
that takes into account the unfolding story of the policy and China’s socio
economic transformation.
Despite these two important caveats, it is stfll clear that the implementa
tion of China’s one-child poHcy has had an enormous impact on Chinese
society, though not always the impact that has been claimed by the state. On
the one hand, there can be no doubt that the size and composition of China’s
population at the beginning of the reform era—young, educated, and under
employed—aided in China’s rapid economic development, or that maintain
ing lower levels of fertility freed up more resources than would otherwise
have been available to invest in human capital. Eager to justify two decades of
state control, however, at the end of the century Chinese authorities declared
that China’s population pohcy had prevented four hundred million births
since 1970. At the time, this assertion went unchallenged in public forums,
with the result that it became a widely known figure and was republished as
fact in many media reports. In fact, the calculations that led to this estimate
were as faulty as the ones that led to the adoption of the one-cluld Hmit,

china’s population policy in historical context

353

exaggerating greatly the impact of the one-child policy and China’s overall
birth-planning program.
That this number was designed to aid state propaganda efforts is made
clear by the choice of 1970 as the starting point for measurement. In 1970,
China’s fertility level remained high. The years 1970—79 did see a gradual
increase in pressures to have fewer children, but the most important devel
opments of those years were the depohticization of arguments for popula
tion control, the creation of a family-planning system to provide education
and support for family planning, and most important, the provision of free
contraceptives to encourage and hasten adoption of some form of birth
control. These efforts had a profound effect on China’s urban and rural
fertility levels, all before the one-child policy got underway. This suggests
that while state action was crucial in hastening fertility decline, these poUcy
developments coincided with increased demand for access to contraceptives
and increased desire of childbearing-age couples to manage their childbear
ing and limit their number of children. As theorists of fertility decline have
noted, a population must be “ready, willing, and able’’ to limit childbearing
before sustained fertility decline can begin. China provided the tools that
enabled young men and women to act on their fertility preferences, encour
aged them with propaganda and education, and created political and eco
nomic incentives to comply.
Choosing the 1970 fertility level as the starting point for calculating the
impact of China’s population policy, therefore, obscured the impact of the
one-child pohcy while allowing the state to offer further justification for it.
It ignored the widespread patterns in fertility dechne seen elsewhere in the
world, particularly the impact of development on childbearing preferences in
the absence of heavy-handed state intervention. Nor did the calculation offer
any way to compare the impact on population size of the one-child policy, as
opposed to a universal two-child policy that focused on the spacing of chil
dren, or an approach premised entirely on guaranteed and substantial rewards
for comphance, or even one that maintained the de facto late-marriage pol
icy that had been in place during the Cultural Revolution. ^"*
If it is difficult to calculate the number ofbirths that were prevented exclu
sively by the one-child policy, it is easy to observe other effects of the policy.
First, it meant that an entire generation of childbearing-age couples was sub
jected to state control over the number of children they were permitted to
have, and when they were permitted to have them. It is important to separate
these two impacts to understand their fuU implications. The one-child birth
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limit meant that childbearing-age couples were not permitted to have more
than one child (or two for couples who met specific conditions), and women
were subjected to constant monitoring by the state and its local agents to
ensure that couples who were compHant at the age of twenty remained compUant at the age of thirty. Less well understood, however, is that in the early
years of the campaign, many women who became pregnant with their first
child, but without official permission, were required to have an abortion.
And in more recent years, as the numbers permitted to have a second child
grew, failure to comply with regulations requiring couples to wait three or
four years to have a second child could also result in pressure to abort.
Women were also the subjects on which most medical procedures were
carried out. Their bodies bore the physical weight of enforcement, and the
state used the birth of a first child or the abortion of a subsequent pregnancy
as an opportunity to insert an lUD or carry out a tubal ligation. This was
particularly true in the countryside, where resistance to the one-child Hmit
was widespread and campaign-style roundups of pregnant women were fre
quent events. Despite recognition in the 1980s that vasectomy was a cheaper
and safer medical alternative to tubal ligation, only a very small proportion
of men underwent the procedure, and no major educational campaigns were
carried out to encourage male sterilization. When asked about this issue in
the early 1990s, both male and female officials in the countryside felt that
attempts to increase the rate of male sterilization were futile. They claimed
that women preferred to take the risk of undergoing steriUzation, fearing
that male sterilization would reduce permanently the strength and viriUty
of their husbands. When asked why those attitudes could not be changed
with the same investment of state resources that had been devoted to imple
menting the one-child policy, it was clear they had never considered that
possibiUty.^^
While men were exhorted to support the one-child pohcy, the female
reproductive system, one of the few areas that had not been completely sub
sumed by the radical pohtics of the Mao era, was explicitly redefined as a pub
lic domain. In addition to the poHcies and regulations passed at each level of
government that brought reproduction under state authority, an even more
visible symbol of state intrusion was the widespread practice in rural China
of publicly documenting the menstrual cycle and birth control method of
each childbearing-age woman in the village. PubUc exposure contributed to
other pressures to conform and underscored the power oflocal authorities to
engineer family size, composition, and change.
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In addition to its direct impact on reproductive age women, the one-child
policy influenced the Chinese family and society in a variety of ways. The
most direct impact on Chinese society was to create a two-track society and
a two-track generation: children who were born in urban areas were over
whelmingly likely to be single children (singletons), and children who had
one or more siblings were most likely rural-born. By 2010, about 63 percent
of all Chinese families had a single child, but in cities the percentage was
much higher. Children were reared, then, in an atmosphere where they were
uniformly surrounded by other singletons, a revolutionary change from the
recent past, and one that raised deep concerns in China about the tempera
ment, values, and psychological well-being of this generation. Development
and commercialization meant that these singletons experienced a degree of
wealth and disposable income that was inconceivable to their parents and
grandparents when they were young. Indulged by grandparents and parents,
they became important consumers in the new economy, altering the bal
ance of power within the family.^*
With no competition from other sibhngs, singletons were the sole ben
eficiary of their parents’ resources and attention. This contributed to par
ents’ abihty to invest in their child’s education and devote themselves to
their socioeconomic advancement, an important dividend of the one-child
pohcy.''^ It also increased pressure on the child to succeed in school, career,
and marriage, sometimes to the detriment of their psychological health.
Meanwhile, the decline and collapse of the aversion to divorce that had been
characteristic of the Maoist era, combined with a simphfied process for legal
divorce, meant that growing numbers of singletons were the children of
divorce, hving with a single parent or vdth a parent and stepparent.’® These
changes, of course, are consistent with social changes that have occurred in
other developing societies, and are not the direct byproduct of the one-child
pohcy. The role of the one-child poHcy was to remove the cushion from
these events sometimes provided by siblings, who can support one another as
they move through wrenching family changes.
Another important consequence of the one-child poUcy was to create a
family structure composed of an inverted triangle: four grandparents, two
parents, and one child (the so-called 4-2-1 phenomenon). Given the tra
ditional Chinese emphasis on care for the elderly, the weight of obligation
to be carried by singletons was a source of concern, both on the micro and
macro levels. At each level, the issue was the same. In micro form, the ques
tion was how a singleton could pay for the care and well-being of seven
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family members, or two married singletons care for fifteen people, includ
ing their single child. In macro form, the question translated into the prob
lem every society faces with population ageing: how can the working adults
in a society care for very large numbers of elderly and youth, and simulta
neously maintain the levels of economic productivity necessary to sustain
economic growth?
As China moved through an exceptionally rapid fertihty decline in the last
decades of the twentieth century, it did so having already achieved an increase
in hfe span and a decUne in mortahty that was exceptional in the developing
world. As a result, its younger generation is smaller than the one that came
before it, and its older generation wiU have an average hfe span consistent
with that of advanced industriaUzed countries. This dependency ratio (most
commonly defined as the total number of elderly and youth as a percentage
of the number of working-age adults) has worsened in many countries in the
industrialized world that have very low fertihty (e.g., Italy and Japan). China
is unique, however, in the degree to which the dependency factor has grown
prior to reaching income levels equivalent to those of advanced industriahzed countries. In 2012, China experienced its first ever natural absolute
decrease in its labor force, with 3.45 milhon fewer workers than the previous
year and a projected dechne of about 29 milhon by the end of the decade. Put
more starkly, in 2009 there were thirteen working-age adults for each elderly
person; by 2050, there will be only two. Persons aged sixty or older comprised
8.8 percent of China’s population in 1990, reached 10 percent by the end of
the century, and was at 13.7 percent in 2013.Though this figure did not yet
place China among those countries with the highest percentages of elderly
population, the raw numbers show the scope of what China faces. By the
year 2013, the elderly population numbered approximately 185 miUion, on its
way up to an estimated 284 million by 2025, and 440 niilHon by 2050.^® This
trend will place tremendous pressure on the working adult population, as their
labor will be expected to generate much of the national wealth needed to care
for their elders and their children.
Another way in which the one-child poHcy has impacted society is
through its contribution to migration and to the creation of a class of chil
dren collectively known as heiren, that is,“black” or illegal persons.This term,
which emerged in the 1980s, is used to describe individuals born without
state permission, and who therefore do not officially exist. As children, heiren
are denied access to any services or benefits that come from being regis
tered officially as part of a household or locale, including access to healthcare
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and schooling. Faced with pressures to abort or pay exorbitant fines for
“unplanned” or illegal births, some parents choose to run, becoming part
of the enormous migrant population that has spread over China during the
reform era. This buys them time to give birth to the child, but it does not
solve the problem of registration. Recent efforts to reform the household
registration {hukou) system, and to permit migrants to register for school in
the location where the family lives, may slowly improve the situation, but in
the short run, those unable to pay the fines for giving birth outside the plan
win continue to be caught in bureaucratic hmbo.*°
One of the most disturbing effects of the one-child pohcy is its contribu
tion to a marked sex ratio imbalance in those born after 1979. Over time
and across many different human populations, sex ratios at birth—that is, the
number of males born during a given time period compared to the number
of females—hover around 105 boys for every 100 girls. On occasion, for a
hmited period of time, this ratio may vary naturally, with a few more or a
few less boys for each 100 girls. Data from China’s 2000 census, however,
revealed that the sex ratio at birth was approximately 119 boys for every 100
girls, and the 2010 census gave similar results. If that were not serious enough,
the national figures mask much more severe distortions, with some provinces
and regions recording sex ratios of 125 or more males for each 100 females.®'
From the beginning of the one-cluld policy, there was concern that the
traditional preference for sons that was deeply embedded in Chinese cul
ture might result in an imbalanced sex ratio at birth. In the September
1980 “Open Letter” on the one-child policy, for example, several of the
most common objections to the policy were aired, including fears that it
would lead to female infanticide and abandonment and, consequently, to
an imbalance in the sex ratio.These fears were initially discounted, but they
proved to be warranted. In the early 1980s senior officials became alarmed
about the many reports of female infanticide and female abandonment on
the part of couples desperate to have a son. The infanticide reports pro
duced a firestorm of controversy at home and abroad, leading the regime to
respond in two contradictory ways. First, it denied that there was a wide
spread problem; census and survey data were used to show that China’s sex
ratio at birth was well within what was considered to be the normal range
and in keeping with China’s own population history. Though conceding
that incidents of infanticide and abandonment did occur, it was insisted
that such cases were rare, and that they occurred only in the most back
ward regions of the countryside, where the “feudal mentality” remained
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entrenched. The solution proposed was an education campaign to uproot
such backward ideas, but education alone was of little use, given the social
and economic reaUties that privileged male offspring.
By 1984, as reports of female infanticide multipUed and the All-China
Women’s Federation (ACWF) began to insist that the problem be faced
and addressed, the state changed tack. Rather than address the underlying
causes of gender bias, however, it made concessions to rural sensibiHties and
adjusted the one-child policy to allow single-daughter households to try
again—for a son. In the countryside, the state conceded, women were con
sidered socially inferior and worth less economically. Sonless couples were
disadvantaged economically and socially, the potential prey of stronger fam
ilies and kin groups. Single-daughter households should therefore be given
special consideration, just as minority groups and the parents of invaHds
were given special consideration. Although the intent of the 1984 poHcy
change was to legitimize what was already happening in the countryside, it
had the effect of reinforcing existing prejudices against females. A woman
with a single daughter and no sons might be applauded by local officials,
but in the real world of the village she was likely subject to a Hfetime of
pity, social ridicule, and blame, much of it heaped upon her by other rural
women who had themselves endured such pressures.
Faced with intense demands from the state, on the one hand, and their peers
and elders, on the other, some took the desperate course of female infanti
cide to preserve the chance to have a son. As the 1980s progressed, however,
two alternative strategies emerged.The first was infant abandonment, which
increased substantially in the late 1980s and 1990s in response to a tightening
of the birth control poHcies. Although some infants were placed with rela
tives or rural famihes without children, in keeping with long-standing cus
tom in China during times of poHtical upheaval and economic crisis, many
were left to be discovered by strangers who turned them over to pubHc secu
rity officials. From there, they were sent to local orphanages, where new pro
cedures were slowly developed to create avenues for adoption. Fearful that
domestic adoption by young couples would undermine the one-child policy,
however, the adoption law passed in 1991 only allowed couples over the age
of thirty-five and childless to adopt a child.This restriction, in turn, led to an
upturn in international adoption, as couples and singles from the prosperous
regions of North America, Europe, and Asia arranged for adoptions.*^
The second strategy for guaranteeing a son was the use of ultrasound
technology and sex-selective abortion. By the early 1990s, most state-run
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hospitals and clinics had acquired ultrasound equipment capable of fetal
sex determination. And as private chnics prohferated in the 1990s, they too
were equipped with ultrasound technology, providing easy access for a fee.
Despite repeated condemnations of sex-selective abortion and attempts to
outlaw the use of ultrasound technology for fetal sex identification, easy
access to the technology, combined with the lure of lucrative bribes and
consultation fees, made ultrasound use very popular. Contrary to official
statements blaming rural backwardness for the problem, it quickly became
clear that the sex ratio distortions were widespread. In 1981, the Chinese sex
ratio at birth, 108.5 males for every 100 females, had already been sHghtly
in excess of the norm. Over the next twenty years, the sex ratio in favor of
males at birth rose dramatically, to approximately in in 1985, 116 in 1992,
and 119 by 2000. A decade later, the 2010 census showed sex ratios at birth
were still hovering around 119 males per 100 females.
In the early 1990s, Chinese experts attributed most of the skew in the sex
ratio to underreporting of female births, particularly illegal births, imply
ing that the actual sex ratio at birth remained within, or close to, acceptable
norms. Provoked by Amartya Sen’s provocative 1990 essay on the “100 mil
lion women” missing in India and China, however, scholarly research and
writing on the issue increased dramatically, as did research on the situation
in China.'*'^ By the late 1990s, candid assessments by Chinese scholars con
cluded that sex-selective abortion was widespread and was the main cause
of the distorted sex ratio. Moreover, accumulating data indicated that the
phenomenon was not just a rural problem, nor was it concentrated in the
least-educated segment of the population. Instead, the combined effect of
the one-child birth hmit, traditional son preference, and easy access to a tech
nology that allowed couples to make sure they had a son was to tempt peo
ple from a wide variety of socioeconomic backgrounds to choose sons over
daughters. Just as the state had justified its attempts to engineer national pop
ulation growth, couples justified the use of sex-selective abortion to engineer
the sex of their only child.
The resulting skew in the sex ratio has raised alarms over the “army of
bachelors,” or as they are referred to in Chinese, “bare branches” (guang
gun-er), who are now, or will be in the future, unable to find wives as adults.
Although this problem has already begun to appear among those born
after 1980, it will get much worse before it gets better. Census data for 2000
revealed about 8.5 milHon missing girls, but by 2010 the number had risen
to more than 20 milHon.'^^ In 2012, there were an estimated 18 million more

36o

REPRODUCTIVE STATES

boys than girls under the age of 15, and by 2020, estimates suggest there may
be anywhere from 30 to 40 million males in marriage-age cohorts who will
be unable to find wives. Even if the sex ratio imbalance returns to balance by
2020, that number will grow, and the impact of these deficits will be felt late
into the twenty-first century.*^®
This deficit of females has already begun to have an impact on marriage
markets in China. Rural men of marriage age compete for a hmited number
of wives from the local area, and as the number of “leftover” men continues
to grow, the higher the costs of marriage become. Men whose famihes are
unable to raise enough money are unable to marry, and frequendy resort to
marriage brokers to help them find brides from other provinces.®’ Despite
these and other efforts, however, the number of unmarried men in their late
twenties is rising rapidly. While the shortage of women has allowed some
brides to marry into a higher economic or social status, others have become
more vulnerable to human trafficking, or to abuse in their new homes, where
they are far removed from their family support system. Conversely, disadvan
taged men are vulnerable to being cheated by marriage brokers, or by the
bride and her family. There have been many reports of brides disappearing
days after their marriage, once the bride’s family had received the compensa
tion they had demanded for their daughter.®*

Conclusion
In his astute essay on the coUapse of the Soviet regimes in eastern Europe
in 1989, Daniel Chirot pointed to the great irony of attempting to build the
sociaHsm of the future on forms of industrial organization that were rapidly
growing obsolete. Massive concentrations of industrial plants and workers
was a late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century approach that helped
Russia overcome its slow start on the road to industrialization, but it was an
inadequate response to the mid-twentieth-century conditions that increas
ingly privileged innovation, speed, adaptability, and global reach. Post-World
War II socialist economies, therefore, were built on structures that were rap
idly becoming an anachronism.®®
The same irony pervades the history of China’s population poHcy, espe
cially the one-child policy. By the time China embraced the one-child poHcy,
nearly everything that inspired it was on the cusp of becoming obsolete.The
intellectual hubris of the population control movement that peaked between
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the mid-1960s and 1980 would shortly thereafter begin to flounder under
the combined challenges of the Green Revolution, revisionist demographic
theories that challenged the orthodox view that population growth impeded
development, and feminist and conservative challenges. Indeed, in retrospect
one might argue that the 1984 UN conference on population held in Mexico
City marked the beginning of the end for orthodox demographic theories
that assumed population control was essential for successful economic devel
opment. At that conference, the Reagan administration sent a conservative
delegation to challenge family planning on revisionist and moral grounds,
while developing countries like Mexico, who were stiU deeply suspicious
of neo-Malthusian arguments in 1974, embraced the orthodox view on the
necessity of population control, and NGOs representing feminist views
embraced a reproductive rights approach that would win the day in Cairo a
decade later.’®
In the midst of this ferment, China moved to embrace precisely the
“numbers is everything” approach that was the core beHef of the population
controllers, wrapping it in a language of sociahst modernization that was
uniquely Chinese. Once in place, and with the full weight of the new reform
leaders behind it, the legitimacy of the project and the validity of the method
were difficult to challenge. The party had declared that the achievement of
“modernization by the year 2000” depended on the successful implemen
tation of the one-child birth Hmit. Even when it became clear that China
would exceed aU expectations for economic growth by the year 2000, even
when it became clear that the social consequences of the policy were severe,
even when “population control” had become a discredited approach to
demographic challenges, the poHcy remained in place. It recedes now as an
anachronism, but its social and poUtical consequences will be felt for decades
to come.
Beyond the consequences discussed above, there is the rage left behind
in many Chinese over the state’s unwillingness to adopt a two-child policy
many years earlier, and its reHance on an enforcement system that privileges
the rich, allowing them to effectively purchase a second child by paying
a large “social compensation fee,” while avoiding the pressure, harassment,
or outright coercion experienced by ordinary Chinese whose pregnancy
is deemed illegal. As Chinese writer Ma Jian noted in a 2013 op-ed in the
NewYork Times, however, venting popular anger against wealthy and famous
individuals hke film director ZhangYimou (accused of fathering seven chil
dren with four different women) “plays into the party’s hands” by deflecting
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public outrage away from “the government’s barbaric policy.’’^’ However
one judges the one-child policy—as an economic and social necessity, a
barbaric violation of human rights and dignity, or a dual-edged sword—it
is important to keep in mind that although the one-child birth limit will
disappear, the state has not conceded its authority to plan China’s popula
tion growth.The birth limit is changing, but the logic that led to a one-child
policy remains in place. Changing demographics, rising popular protest, and
global influences have certainly moderated China’s approach to implemen
tation of birth hmits, as well as the language used to describe the program,
but the Chinese approach to population policy remains grounded in the
principle of state sovereignty over reproduction.This enduring claim, and its
policy consequences, will continue to set the Chinese case apart for many
years to come.
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